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Justification for Conscience Exemptions in Health Care 
 
By Lori Kantymir and Carolyn McLeod 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Some bioethicists argue that conscientious objectors in health 
care should have to justify themselves, just as objectors in the military do. They 
should have to provide reasons that explain why they should be exempt from 
offering the services that they find offensive. There are two versions of this 
view in the literature, each giving different standards of justification. We show 
these views are each either too permissive (i.e. would result in problematic 
exemptions based on conscience) or too restrictive (i.e. would produce 
problematic denials of exemption). We then develop a middle ground position 
that we believe better combines respect for the conscience of health care 
professionals with concern for the duties that they owe to patients. Our claim, in 
short, is that insofar as objectors should have to justify themselves, they should 
have to do it according to the standard that we defend rather than according to 
the standards that others have developed.    
 
 
In many parts of the world, physicians are free to object conscientiously to 
providing medical services that are legal and often deemed essential, but that 
they find morally offensive, such as abortions and contraception. In some 
jurisdictions, other health care professionals, such as pharmacists, have this 
 
 
 2 
freedom as well. The right of these professionals to refuse such services tends 
to be “unlimited in practice,” because no one evaluates the objections that the 
professionals make.1 They do not have to explain to anyone why they are 
objecting. They do not even have to prove that their objection stems from 
conscience, rather than from some other source (e.g. mere preference). 
 Some commentators find this state of affairs untenable. They argue that 
conscientious objectors in health care should have to justify themselves, just as 
objectors in the military do. They should have to provide reasons that can 
excuse them from offering services that, according to their profession, they are 
duty-bound to offer. There are two versions of this view in the literature. One, 
from Christopher Meyers and Robert Woods, states that objectors in health care 
should be required to show that the beliefs on which their objections rest are 
passionately-held moral or religious beliefs that they must adhere to for the 
sake of their mental well-being.2 The other view is from Robert Card: objectors 
should be required to prove that the beliefs that ground their objections are 
“reasonable” and “justifiable.”3 To be clear on the difference between these 
                                               
1 R. F. Card. Conscientious Objection and Emergency Contraception. AJOB 
2007; 7(6): 8-14: 13. 
2 An obligation to provide abortion services: what happens when physicians 
refuse? J Med Ethics 1996; 22: 115-120; Conscientious Objection? Yes, But 
Make Sure it is Genuine. AJOB 2007; 7(6): 19-20.  
3 Op. cit. note 1, p. 13; R. F. Card. Conscientious Objection, Emergency 
Contraception, and Public Policy. J Med Philos 2011; 36(1): 53-68. 
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positions: Meyers and Woods demand that objectors reveal what motivates their 
objection in an effort to prove that it is genuinely conscientious; but, at the 
same time, they need not demonstrate that what motivates them is justifiable 
and thus ought to motivate others. Card, by contrast, requires that they do the 
latter. Call the first view, Proving Genuineness, and the second, Proving 
Reasonableness.  
We are sympathetic to the general view that conscientious objectors in 
health care should have to justify themselves (i.e. justify why they, or anyone, 
should be exempt from performing what is taken to be a professional duty). In 
the first part of this paper, we discuss why such sympathy is warranted. We then 
move on to explain that the positions found in the literature on what objectors 
need to do to justify themselves are problematic. As we demonstrate, Proving 
Genuineness is not enough, and Proving Reasonableness is too much. We 
defend a middle-ground position that we believe better combines respect for the 
conscience of health care professionals with concern for the duties that they 
owe to patients.   
1. Why push for some justification? 
Some commentators would not push for any requirement that health care 
professionals justify their conscientious objections. These people might lack 
sympathy for objectors, believing that they could never be justified in doing 
what they are doing.4 Alternatively, they might feel that managing conscientious 
                                               
4 Julian Savulescu suggests as much when he writes, “[i]f people are not 
prepared to offer legally permitted, efficient, and beneficial care to a patient 
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objections in the way that they are currently managed, especially in medicine, is 
appropriate: that is, do not evaluate whether objections are genuine or 
reasonable; simply demand that objectors give referrals to health care 
professionals who will perform the requested service.5 Finally, some might 
oppose having objectors justify themselves because of the need this creates for 
committees to examine objectors’ reasons for objecting. The concern might be 
that having all objectors appear before a committee is not feasible or that the 
adjudication of reasons by the committee will be unavoidably unfair.6 
We think that each of these concerns is important but that none of them 
weighs heavily enough against the idea of objectors justifying themselves that 
we should abandon this idea. Since our primary goal is the modest one of 
defending a proposal in favour of justification for conscience exemptions that 
improves upon the proposals made by Card and by Meyers and Woods, we will 
not provide a knockdown argument for why justification of any kind is 
                                                                                                                             
because it conflicts with their values, they should not be doctors” (quoted in M. 
Wicclair. 2011. Conscientious Objection in Health Care: An Ethical Analysis. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press: 33; Savulescu. Conscientious 
Objection in Medicine. BMJ 2006; 332(2): 294.) 
5 See, e.g. J. Cantor & K. Baum. The Limits of Conscientious Objections: May 
Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception? New 
Engl J Med 2004; 351(19): 2008-2012. 
6 M. Wicclair. Reasons and Health Care Professionals Claims of Conscience. 
AJOB 2007; 7(6): 21-22. 
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necessary. Still, before getting to our main argument, let us explain briefly why 
we believe that some justification is important and why each of the opposing 
positions just outlined is wrong-headed.    
For at least two reasons, we reject the claim that conscientious objection 
in health care is never justified, which would make attempts at justifying 
objections pointless. First and foremost, this view fails to appreciate that some 
objections will be morally justified and that the moral integrity of the 
profession may require that they be made. The example that stands out for us is 
the refusal by some health care professionals to participate in prenatal sex 
selection.7 Second, to be opposed to all conscientious objection in health care—
whatever the reason for it and regardless of whether it causes harm—is to fail to 
take seriously enough the moral gravity of requiring someone to act against 
sincerely held moral beliefs, especially those that concern life or death, which 
influence many objections in health care.  
But why not just accept the status quo on conscientious objection in 
medicine—that is, allow objectors to refuse requests for procedures that they 
find offensive but require that they make a referral? Even if their objections are 
not justified in any way, patients should still get what they need because of the 
referrals. This is the second position we described above that opposes 
justification. In our view, there are four problems with it. One is that some 
objectors simply cannot adhere to the status quo, because they are the only 
                                               
7 B. Leier & A. T. Thiele. Towards an Ethical Policy for the Prevention of Fetal 
Sex-Selection in Canada. JOGC 2010; 32(1): 54-57. 
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doctor in town or all of the other doctors are conscientious objectors. This 
problem reveals that the status quo cannot function in all cases to protect 
physician conscience and patient access to services.  
A further problem is that the status quo appears to ignore concerns 
about complicity. Consider that a physician’s conscience can demand that she 
refuse not only to perform certain interventions, but also to make referrals for 
them, because doing so would make her complicit in what she takes to be an 
immoral act. Indeed, in her mind, the acts of providing the care herself and 
giving a referral for it might be equally blameworthy. As Mark Wicclair points 
out, “considerable deference should be given to a health care professional’s 
conception of moral complicity,” if the goal is to respect this person’s 
conscience.8 It follows that insofar as the status quo aims, in part, to respect 
conscience, it probably does so poorly in some cases.  
Yet another problem—one that we believe is particularly grave—is that 
by omitting any requirement that objectors explain their objections, the status 
quo leaves the door open for discriminatory refusals. Do we really think that 
racist, sexist, or homophobic health care professionals should be free to refuse 
care to the people they deem to be morally inferior, just so long as they give 
referrals? Some would say that it is worse to require them to treat these people, 
because the “care” they provide will inevitably be substandard. But we think 
the better response is to deny these professionals the opportunity to care for 
anyone until they learn the error of their ways. They could undergo mandatory 
                                               
8 Op. cit. note 4, p. 42.  
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sensitivity training, and if they fail at that, look elsewhere for employment.   
One final problem is that referrals are not appropriate when the 
objection itself is morally justified. An example is an objection to giving a 
woman an eleventh round of IVF (one involving ovarian stimulation), when the 
first ten rounds were unsuccessful and there is no reason to think the eleventh 
round would go any better. Such an objection is arguably justified because, 
again, there is no reason to think that the intervention would be effective and 
also because of documented risks to women’s health, of ovarian stimulation in 
particular.9 In our view, conscientious objections by health care professionals 
that are morally justified should not be followed up by referrals.  
To be clear, our point is not that conscientious objectors should never 
have to give referrals, but simply that always requiring referrals, and only 
referrals, is problematic. Someone might object that insisting on some 
justification from conscientious objectors would be equally problematic. Is it 
really feasible to have all objectors come before committees and explain why 
they ought to be excused from providing certain services? Can we trust that the 
committees will be fair in their assessments of objectors’ reasons for objecting? 
Those who adopt the third position outlined above against justification give 
negative answers to both of these questions.  
We take concerns about feasibility and fairness seriously. Indeed, the 
                                               
9 See A. Girolami et al. Arterial thrombosis in young women after ovarian 
stimulation: case report and review of the literature. J Thromb Thrombolys 
2007; 24: 169–74 
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concern about fairness, in particular, influences what we recommend in terms of 
what kind of justification objectors should have to provide. But we do not think 
justification for conscientious objection is a non-starter because the 
adjudication of reasons would be neither feasible nor fair. To respond to the 
complaint about feasibility, surely there are ways in which the adjudication 
could happen. Objectors could have to apply for conscience exemptions, and 
state licensing boards or professional societies could be responsible for 
deciding how the applications will be reviewed and who will review them.10 We 
deny not that this task would be complicated, but only that it is impossible.  
We also believe that continuing with the status quo is not feasible. Too 
much conscientious objection in some parts of the world has made it impossible 
for health care professions or governments to meet their commitments to 
provide certain kinds of health care, especially abortions.11 By restricting 
conscientious objections in health care to those that can be justified, we will 
likely cut down on the number of objections and on the shortages that 
objections create.12 
                                               
10 At least one other theorist has suggested using licensing boards to help solve 
conflicts of conscience in health care: H. F. Lynch. 2008. Conflicts of 
Conscience in Health Care: An Institutional Compromise. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.  
11 See, e.g. J. Laurance. Abortion crisis as doctors refuse to perform surgery. 
The Independent 2007; April 16. 
12 So why not require that objections be justified only in places where they 
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The worry that committees will not evaluate reasons for objecting fairly 
is a worry about bias on the committees: that they will simply promote the 
interests of “powerful elites,” for example.13 To calm this worry, we follow 
Meyers and Woods in recommending that the committee members be diverse in 
terms of their race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, academic training (and, we 
would add, gender, class, and sexual orientation).14 We do not presume that 
diversity alone, however, can answer the concern about fairness. Thus, we 
return to this problem and respond to it more thoroughly below.    
2. Proving Genuineness: Meyers & Woods 
In their paper, “Conscientious Objection? Yes, But Make Sure It is Genuine,” 
Meyers and Woods remind readers of an argument they made in a previous 
paper15 about the need for physicians who conscientiously object to abortion to 
justify not having to provide abortion services. The argument goes as follows. 
Physicians have a duty to offer “vital and socially sanctioned” medical services, 
and these include abortions.16 Since objectors are asking not to have to perform 
                                                                                                                             
might seriously inhibit access to services (J. Marsh. Conscientious Refusal and 
Reason-giving. Bioethics forthcoming)? To reply, safeguarding access is not the 
only reason to require that objectors justify themselves. Another reason is to 
prevent discrimination. 
13 Meyers & Woods 1996, op. cit. note 2, p. 118.  
14 Ibid: 119. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid: 117. 
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what is in fact their duty, they should have to justify themselves. They can do 
so, moreover, by proving that their objection is genuinely conscientious, which, 
by and large, entails that the beliefs motivating it are moral or religious and are 
central to their value framework.  
Meyers and Woods claim that proving genuineness is tantamount to 
objectors proving that having to perform the relevant duty would cause them 
unwarranted moral and psychological distress. The harm they would suffer in 
having to perform abortions is impermissible, according to Meyers and Woods, 
only if this harm is greater than what patients would suffer in having one less 
abortion provider. But Meyers and Woods appear to assume that the harm to the 
objector will always be greater, that is, if this person is experiencing a “true 
crisis of conscience.”17 To show, then, that her objection is justified, the 
objector simply has to show that it is genuine.18  
                                               
17 Ibid: 119. 
18 Meyers and Woods list criteria for evaluating conscientious objections, most 
of which concern whether the objections are genuine (ibid). One exception is 
the following criterion: “all reasonable alternatives must be explored, for 
example, finding another physician to perform the procedure.” Perhaps their 
idea is that objectors are only justified in their actions if they find reasonable 
alternatives for their patients. If that is true, then objectors have to do more than 
prove genuineness. But whether it is true is unclear, because Meyers and Woods 
leave open who should explore reasonable alternatives for the patient. It may be 
that employers or the profession have this job, in which case objectors only 
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In requiring that objectors prove genuineness, Meyers and Woods are 
suggesting that they give reasons of a certain sort for their objection. These are 
motivating reasons as opposed to normative reasons. Motivating reasons 
explain what causes an agent to act as she did. They are not normative, because 
they have no power to motivate others to act in the same way. Normative 
reasons have such power—over rational agents—because they are “as a matter 
of fact good reasons for action.”19 
  Turning to an evaluation of Meyers and Woods’ position: as a response 
to a particular problem—a lack of genuineness among some conscientious 
objectors—their contribution is important. They refer to a case involving a 
public hospital in California that was legally responsible for providing first- and 
second-trimester abortions to women who were either imprisoned in the county 
                                                                                                                             
have to prove the genuineness of their objection.  
19 C. Miller. Motivation in Agents. Nous 2008; 42(2): 222-266: 224, his 
emphasis. Meyers and Woods indicate at one point that the reasons they are 
looking for from objectors are “shared reasons for action,” that is, normative 
reasons (op. cit. note 2, 1996, p. 117; quoting L. Winner. 1986. The Whale and 
the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press: 159). Yet this suggestion does not fit with the rest 
of their article, in particular, with the criteria they offer for evaluating 
objections, which say nothing about whether the beliefs motivating objections 
could be shared by rational agents.  
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jail or were not competent to make medical decisions for themselves.20 The 
hospital could not find within its ranks a physician who was qualified or willing 
to perform the abortions. All Ob/Gyn physicians appealed to California’s 
conscience clause, which protected refusals to provide abortion services by 
health care workers who declared in writing that they held “a moral, ethical, or 
religious objection” to abortion. Each of the physicians made the relevant 
declaration even though some of them objected to abortion mainly on economic 
grounds (e.g. abortion services are “typically not lucrative”) or on aesthetic 
grounds (e.g. second-trimester abortions are “frankly ugly”).21 Conscience was 
not obviously driving them to object; but the conscience clause did not require 
them to prove that conscience was their motive. This case clearly illustrates the 
value of having physicians and other health care professionals show that they 
are genuine when they appeal to conscience clauses.     
Although Meyers and Woods’s main point is valuable, the process they 
recommend for having objectors prove that they deserve a conscience 
exemption would produce some seriously problematic exemptions. The sorts of 
cases we have in mind are those in which empirical beliefs grounding the 
objection are baseless, moral or religious beliefs grounding it are 
discriminatory, or the harm the objector would experience if he had to perform 
the relevant service is not greater or is only marginally worse than what his 
prospective patients would suffer if he did not perform it. Let us consider each 
                                               
20 Op. cit. note 2, 1996, p. 115. 
21 Ibid: 118. 
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of these possibilities in turn.  
First, what if the objection rests on an empirical claim that is baseless? 
In other words, there is no evidence to back it up; the scientific community 
would reject it or has done so already? Consider a hypothetical case of a 
physician who refuses to give children the MMR (Measles, Mumps, and 
Rubella) vaccine on the grounds that there is a proven link between the vaccine 
and autism. The physician insists on this fact even after the British Medical 
Journal declares that research that supported it was fraudulent.22 She, the 
physician, could prove that her conscientious objection is genuine, simply by 
showing that she fervently believes that the MMR vaccine is dangerous to 
children. Moreover, any review board that evaluates her objection could 
reasonably conclude that the harm to her of having to violate her conscience is 
greater than any harm children or their parents would suffer as a direct result of 
her objection, especially if they could obtain the vaccine at a different clinic and 
would probably not be dissuaded from doing so by the physician. It seems that 
Meyers and Woods would have to agree with the physician being excused from 
having to offer the MMR vaccine. But surely this is a problematic result.  
The point here is that empirical beliefs that ground a health care 
professional’s objection need to be defensible. To be sure, such a stance goes 
against the tradition of evaluating only whether conscientious objectors are 
sincere in their objection and not whether the grounds for their objection are 
                                               
22 F. Godlee et al. Wakefield’s article linking MMR vaccine and autism was 
fraudulent. BMJ 2011; 342: c7452. 
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reasonable.23 However, there are important values other than respect for 
conscience at stake when deciding whether to permit conscientious objections 
in health care, and these values encourage the critical assessment of empirical 
claims made by objectors. The competing value of professionalism does so in 
particular. Implicit in the notion of being a professional is that one “possesses 
the necessary knowledge” to fulfill one’s role.24 Conscientious objectors cannot 
insist that as health care professionals, they receive conscience protection when 
technical ignorance rather than knowledge informs their conscience.      
Second, Meyers and Woods would have to allow that conscientious 
objections are justified when they are grounded in moral or religious beliefs 
that are discriminatory (i.e. sexist, racist, or homophobic). Surely, objectors 
who have beliefs of this sort could prove genuineness. But this simply shows 
that proving genuineness alone could not establish a legitimate need for 
conscience protection. There is widespread agreement, and rightly so, that 
discriminatory refusals do not deserve protection.25  
                                               
23 A. Gewirth. 1974. Reasons and Conscience: The Claims of the Selective 
Conscientious Objector. In Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs. V. 
Held et al, eds. New York: Oxford UP: 93-4. 
24 E. D. Pellegrino. Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality. AJOB 2006; 
6(2): 65-71: 67. 
25 The idea here is that these refusals are intolerable. But one might insist that 
some non-discriminatory refusals are intolerable as well (e.g. a refusal by a 
physician to perform blood transfusions because people sacrifice their eternal 
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Last, what about cases where the harm that the genuine objector would 
suffer if she had to go against her conscience was not greater or was only 
marginally worse than the harm her prospective patients would face if she did 
not honour their requests? The suggestion in Meyers and Woods’s argument 
that the harm to the objector in abortion cases will always be greater is not 
obviously true (although a sympathetic reading of their work could allow them 
some exceptions, such as when the woman’s life is at risk). Moreover, to 
assume that the harm to the objector only has to be greater—and so could just 
be marginally worse—is misleading, for it implies that the objector and patient 
are equally responsible for the moral conflict they are in. In reality, the objector 
bears more responsibility than the patient, because she, the objector, did not 
have to choose to be a health care professional or to choose the specialty she is 
in. The voluntary aspect of being a health care professional suggests that 
conscientious objection is not justified if patients would suffer substantial harm. 
Objectors ought to have to prove not only that the harm of them violating their 
conscience would be great, but also that harm to patients would be minimal or 
would simply not occur. We develop this idea in more detail below.  
                                                                                                                             
soul when they have blood transfusions). Thus, to focus exclusively on 
discriminatory refusals is problematic. We agree with this criticism, but have 
found it difficult to flesh out a broader category of intolerable refusals (vs. 
merely discriminatory ones). We leave this task for another time not only 
because we believe it is complicated, but also because we want to highlight the 
problem of leaving room for discriminatory refusals. 
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At this point, we hope to have said enough to convince the reader that 
justification for conscience exemptions in health care must involve more than 
proving genuineness. Health care professionals’ voluntary role as professionals 
and their duty not to discriminate against patients, among other duties, makes 
the justification for these exemptions more complicated than Meyers and 
Woods suggest that it is.    
3. Proving Reasonableness: Card 
What about describing the necessary justification as proving the reasonableness 
of one’s beliefs rather than their genuineness? Card makes this suggestion: the 
“beliefs on which conscientious objection is based must be reasonable and 
should be subject to evaluation in terms of their justifiability.”26 On this view, 
objectors must show not merely that they passionately hold the relevant beliefs, 
but that they hold them for good reasons. In short, they must prove that they 
have normative reasons for their refusal: reasons that others should accept. 
Card develops his view in response to pharmacists refusing to provide 
women with emergency contraception (EC). He argues, in short, that because of 
their role-related responsibilities and the great harm their refusals can cause 
patients, objecting pharmacists ought to have to provide “justifying reasons” for 
their objection to EC. 27 Card thinks that none of the reasons they could have for 
objecting are justifiable, for it is not reasonable to assume either that EC is 
anything other than a form of contraception or that contraception is somehow 
                                               
26 Op. cit. note 1, p. 13. 
27 Op. cit. note 3, 2011, p. 62.  
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immoral.28 Thus, according to Card, even if they tried, objectors could not 
prove their reasonableness and should not be excused from having to dispense 
EC.   
Card’s model is an improvement over that of Meyers and Woods. It 
narrows the overly broad scope of permissible refusals that we get in Meyers 
and Woods by ruling out objections grounded in the sort of beliefs discussed 
above: empirical beliefs that are baseless and moral or religious beliefs that are 
discriminatory. Conscientious objections motivated by such beliefs could not be 
reasonable.  
Nonetheless, Card’s model, like that of Meyers and Woods, is flawed. 
Jason Marsh rightly complains that Card fails to describe what he means by 
reasonableness or justifiability.29 We think he has to mean, at least, that the 
beliefs motivating the objection are as likely or more likely to be true than 
beliefs that support the service the objector finds offensive. (So, for example, 
the burden for the anti-abortionist would be to prove that a pro-life stance on 
abortion is as plausible or more plausible than a pro-choice one. If it is as 
plausible, then the objector could rightly insist that he cannot be obligated to 
ignore his pro-life views.) We argue that, so understood, Proving 
Reasonableness is too restrictive. It would result in some problematic denials of 
exemption based on conscience. At the same time, it could produce some 
problematic exemptions based on conscience, making it too permissive (though 
                                               
28 Op. cit. note 1, p. 10.  
29 Marsh, op. cit. note 12. 
 
 
 18 
not as permissive as Proving Genuineness). Let us explain. 
To see why Card’s model is too restrictive, consider cases in which the 
objector cannot prove reasonableness, but the objection is genuine and 
grounded neither in empirical beliefs that are baseless nor in moral or religious 
beliefs that are discriminatory. Further, the objector can promise that she will be 
respectful toward patients who request the relevant service and that they will 
get ready access to it elsewhere. An example would be an objection to most 
abortions on grounds that the fetus is a person, where the objector can and will 
provide referrals for abortion in a morally appropriate manner.30 We think to 
prohibit objections of this sort would be to fail to take conscience seriously 
enough. Because Card would have us prohibit them (assuming that the 
objectors could not prove reasonableness), we should reject Card’s model. He 
would oppose conscience exemptions in such cases, even though the 
exemptions would not harm patients.  
To see how Card’s model could be too permissive while at the same 
time being too restrictive, consider that a lack of fairness in adjudicating 
reasonableness would probably produce some problematic exemptions and 
problematic denials of exemption based on conscience. Some review panels 
will not assess reasonableness fairly, that is, without unfairly privileging certain 
                                               
30 On why it is important that referrals be respectful, see C. McLeod. Harm or 
Mere Inconvenience? Denying Women Emergency Contraception. Hypatia 
2010; 25(1): 11-30. 
 
 
 19 
moral views.31 We have this worry, in particular, about the evaluation of 
refusals grounded neither in empirical beliefs that are baseless nor in moral or 
religious beliefs that are discriminatory. Consider a belief (or set of beliefs) that 
arguably falls into neither of these categories: abortion is immoral because 
fetuses are persons. There is profound disagreement in many societies about the 
morality of abortion. We assume, given such disagreement, that evaluations of 
the reasonableness of conscientious objections to abortion will vary among 
review panels, with some deeming these objections reasonable and others not. 
Those that favour extreme anti-abortion views, for example, will do so 
unjustifiably. They will issue morally problematic exemptions to the duty of 
health care professionals to participate in (or at least not prevent) abortions.  
Notice that unfairness in adjudicating the normativity of reasons for or 
against abortion could also produce morally problematic denials of exemption 
to one’s duty: that is, if the duty extends to all abortions, including, for 
example, sex-selective ones. A physician who refuses to perform sex-selective 
abortions in a society that condones or encourages sex selection (e.g. China or 
the US) may fail to prove the reasonableness of his position to a panel of 
review. We think the denial of an exemption to him would unfairly privilege 
this society’s view about sex selection.  
In general, deciding whether objectors should receive exemptions based 
on whether they can provide normative reasons for their refusal could create 
                                               
31 Wicclair, op. cit. note 6. 
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substantial unfairness.32 Giving objectors an opportunity to present normative 
reasons for their views is important nonetheless, as we describe below. We turn 
now to a stance on justification for conscientious objection in health care that 
we prefer and that follows clearly from the criticisms we have raised of Card, 
and of Meyers and Woods.  
4. Proving reasonableness or genuineness plus: Kantymir & McLeod  
We think health care professionals who have a conscientious objection should 
have two options for defending their objection: prove either 1) that it is 
reasonable, in particular by showing that what grounds the objection is as likely 
or more likely to be true than what grounds the standard of care for patients, or 
2) that it is genuine, plus that it satisfies certain criteria. For option 2), the 
criteria are as follows: patients will still get the care they need in a respectful 
and timely fashion, any empirical beliefs on which the objection rests are not 
baseless, and the moral or religious beliefs on which it rests are not 
discriminatory.  
To get clear on our position, consider how it would apply to the case of 
                                               
32 We accept that this potential exists in evaluating not just the reasonableness 
but also the genuineness of objections. However, we believe that the problem is 
more serious with the former. Simply put, determining whether people’s views 
are justifiable is generally less straightforward than determining whether they 
are genuinely committed to those views. To decide the latter, we can often just 
look to their behaviour to see whether it is consistent with the relevant 
commitments. 
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a pharmacist who refuses to dispense EC. The pharmacist would first choose 
whether he wants to attempt to prove reasonableness (as understood above). If 
he does so33 and he succeeds, then the review panel would give him license to 
object conscientiously to EC (and especially if the panel decides that the beliefs 
grounding this objection are more likely to be true than beliefs that support EC, 
then it might also lobby government or pharmacists’ groups to oppose EC). If 
the pharmacist does not succeed or does not want to prove reasonableness, then 
he will have to demonstrate that his objection is genuine, plus that the following 
are true: 1) patients would still have timely access to EC and would be treated 
respectfully while being directed to pharmacists who dispense it; 2) there is 
some evidence in favour of the beliefs about EC that underlie the objection; and 
3) the relevant moral or religious beliefs are not discriminatory. This last 
criterion requires that the pharmacist not be motivated by, for example, the 
sexist belief that women are obligated as women to ensure that they and their 
sexual partners use protection, and thus that women who request EC are 
irresponsible and do not deserve it as a result. If the pharmacist can show that 
he is genuine and can satisfy the above three criteria, then he will succeed in 
                                               
33 Note that in doing so, he might lose the status of “conscientious objector” if 
conscientious objections typically are not aimed at communicating to others 
that the relevant duty or norm is misguided. Instead, his actions might qualify 
as civil disobedience. See K. Brownlee. 2009. Civil Disobedience. Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. E. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-
disobedience/ [Accessed 21 February 2013]. 
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proving “genuineness plus.” And the review panel would then have to excuse 
him from having to dispense EC.  
Our reasons for accepting the above model are evident in our analyses 
of Card and of Meyers and Woods. Even so, let us summarize them. First, the 
invitation to objectors to prove reasonableness makes it possible for us to learn 
from their refusals and also for objectors to pursue a goal they might have in 
objecting: to convince us that some change in health care practice is needed.34 
Conscientious objectors can help to expose morally weak or corrupt norms in 
health care. Yet for that to happen, a forum needs to exist for them to defend the 
reasonableness of their objections. It is only fitting that this opportunity be the 
one in which they try to justify their refusal to fulfill the duty that morally 
offends them.  
Second, our model supports the duties that objectors have to their 
patients, which is the aim, in particular, of the “plus” part of genuineness plus. 
For instance, requiring objectors to ensure that patients can still get respectful 
and timely treatment promotes duties of patient care. Insisting that any 
empirical claims underlying their objections have some scientific basis to them 
supports standards of knowledge appropriate to their role and the trust that 
patients have in them as professionals. Finally, requiring that relevant moral or 
religious beliefs are not discriminatory prevents objectors from subjecting 
patients to oppressive treatment under the guise of religious or moral freedom.  
                                               
34 Granted, this outcome is unlikely if the objector’s beliefs are fundamentally 
different from our own.  
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Third, our model would produce, in total, fewer problematic exemptions 
and denials of exemption than the models of either Meyers/Woods or Card. 
There would be fewer problematic exemptions than with Meyers and Woods’s 
model because of the plus part of genuineness plus. There would be fewer 
problematic denials of exemption than with Card’s model because objectors 
who cannot prove reasonableness but who can prove genuineness plus should 
get an exemption, which we have argued is as things should be. The reason for 
not being able to prove reasonableness could be that the objection is simply 
unreasonable or that the review panel would not judge it fairly.  
Notice that unfortunately, our model would not necessarily create fewer 
problematic exemptions, as opposed to denials of exemption, compared with 
Card’s model. Some objectors will succeed in proving reasonableness even 
though their objections are not reasonable, because some review panels will 
evaluate some objections poorly, with the result that exemptions based on 
reasonableness occur without good reason. Below, we suggest a way to 
minimize this problem, which fortunately exists for us no more than it does for 
Card.  
To sum up, we think the standard for justifying conscientious objections 
in health care needs to be more strict than what Meyers and Woods recommend, 
but less strict than what Card proposes. Objectors should have to prove 
genuineness plus rather than mere genuineness. Alternatively, they could prove 
reasonableness; however, they should not have to do so. We hope that the need 
for and merit of our view is clear. 
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5. Imperfections and Conclusion 
No model for the justification of conscience exemptions in health care will be 
perfect. Nonetheless, we feel that we can minimize the imperfections in our 
own view by taking certain criticisms of it seriously, two in particular. 
First, as noted above, our model will not produce fewer problematic 
exemptions than Card’s because it still relies upon the adjudication of putatively 
normative reasons, which can be unreliable. As a result, objectors could 
succeed in proving reasonableness even though their objections are not 
reasonable. For example, the pro-life health care professional whose objection 
is reviewed by a panel that is predominantly pro-life will probably be excused 
from having to provide abortion services on the grounds that abortions are 
immoral, which is (arguably) false, at least about most abortions.   
To respond to this first criticism, we would like to propose that an 
appeals process be set up so that poor decisions of review boards could be 
overturned. An appeal should be open not only to objectors, but also to their 
colleagues, to their prospective patients, or really to any interested party. For 
example, Planned Parenthood could appeal when an objector succeeds in 
proving the reasonableness of a pro-life objection to abortion. Although 
introducing such a measure would not eliminate bad exemptions of this sort, it 
could surely minimize them.  
Second, we do not provide standards for judging which moral or 
religious beliefs are discriminatory. But review panels may differ in which 
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beliefs they deem to be discriminatory, which will generate unfairness.35 
In response, giving review panels some guidance on what they should 
count as discriminatory would be appropriate. A handbook on discrimination 
that outlines the different ways in which sexism, racism, and the like can 
manifest themselves should be helpful for this purpose. The goal in arming 
review panels with such material would be to make the review process less 
imperfect than it would otherwise be. In particular, evaluations of the plus part 
of genuineness plus would be more reliable.       
  In summary, there will inevitably be some unfairness in deciding, in 
practice, what counts as a justified conscientious objection. However, by fine-
tuning our model of justification, we believe that we have come closer to 
creating a fair process than our counterparts in the literature do.  
To conclude, insofar as conscientious objectors in health care ought to 
justify their objections (in our view, they ought to do so), the justification 
should take the form of proving either reasonableness or genuineness plus. A 
                                               
35 Ultimately they may decide differently, for example, about whether the 
“Christian pharmacist who refuses to fill birth control prescriptions differs only 
in degree and not in kind from the Talibanesque taxi driver who refuses to serve 
women who are unaccompanied by their male relatives” (E. Anderson. 2005. 
So you want to live in a free society? (5): Common property, common carriers, 
and the case of the conscientious objecting pharmacist. Left2Right. Available at: 
http://left2right.typepad.com/main/2005/08/so_you_want_to_.html) [Accessed 
21 February 2013]).  
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refusal should not have to be reasonable for the objector to receive some 
conscience protection. Thus, Card’s view is too restrictive. At the same time, 
not every refusal that is genuine warrants an exemption. Thus, Meyers and 
Woods’ view is too permissive. We have proposed a middle-ground position 
that accords, by comparison, greater respect to the conscience of health care 
professionals and to the dignity and health of their patients.   
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